New
Introducing React Bench, see how different models perform on React code

react-doctor/nosql-injection-risk

Building a NoSQL query from raw client input lets an attacker inject operator-shaped keys or `$where` code and read or alter data they should not.

Status
Active
Category
Security
Assessment
Evidence-required risk
Required evidence
source code, repository context
Default configuration
Enabled
Default severity
warn
Show technical metadata
Scope
All supported frameworks
Active when
production .js/.ts/.jsx/.tsx/.py files; test/build/doc/generated paths skipped
Tags
security-scan
Priority
82 (P1)
Source
oxlint-plugin-react-doctor
Rule set
oxlint-plugin-react-doctor 0.9.3 (prompt schema 2)
On this page

Validation prompt

Confirm the detector match and collect the required evidence before deciding whether an edit is warranted.

Fires on operator-shaped query construction: a $where value built from a template-literal ${…}, a function, or a Python f-string; .find(JSON.parse(req|request.…)); an .aggregate([{ … $where … }]) pipeline; new RegExp(req|request.…); or a $regex: req|request.… operator. Comments are stripped for JS/TS.

Suppress when: the $where/$regex/RegExp value is a hard-coded server-side constant rather than client input, or the JSON.parse(req…) result is validated/coerced (operator keys stripped, fields cast to scalars) before it reaches the query: the static check cannot see that sanitization and may over-report.

Evidence boundary

The diagnostic proves only that the detector’s modeled source pattern matched. It does not prove runtime impact, product intent, rendered failure, or that one remediation is correct.

Establish the environment, repository policy, exceptions, and required rendered or runtime evidence before deciding the occurrence.

Record one outcome:

  • Confirmed failure: The required evidence establishes the violation.
  • Rejected: A documented exception or false-positive predicate applies.
  • Needs evidence: Named evidence can still be collected.
  • Unavailable: Required evidence cannot be collected in this run.
  • Waived with evidence: An authorized, scoped exception applies to an established failure.
  • Observation: The review records an optional tradeoff without claiming a defect.

A waiver records its scope, authority, evidence, and review condition. It is not a pass or false positive.

Default severity is registry metadata. Use the occurrence’s JSON severity after repository configuration when ordering real findings.

Fix prompt

Apply this candidate correction only after the required evidence confirms the risk.

Coerce each query field to its expected scalar type (for example String(req.query.id)) and reject objects or $-prefixed operator keys from client input before building the filter. Avoid $where (server-side JavaScript) entirely, replace request-derived new RegExp/$regex with anchored, escaped patterns or exact matches, and never pass JSON.parse(req.body) straight into .find/.aggregate.

Repository-wide copy prompt

Use this repository-wide prompt only after validating each occurrence. For one occurrence, use the guidance above.

Show repository-wide prompt

Fix every confirmed react-doctor/nosql-injection-risk diagnostic in the current repository.

Required change:

  • Coerce each query field to its expected scalar type (for example String(req.query.id)) and reject objects or $-prefixed operator keys from client input before building the filter. Avoid $where (server-side JavaScript) entirely, replace request-derived new RegExp/$regex with anchored, escaped patterns or exact matches, and never pass JSON.parse(req.body) straight into .find/.aggregate.

Validation before editing:

Fires on operator-shaped query construction: a $where value built from a template-literal ${…}, a function, or a Python f-string; .find(JSON.parse(req|request.…)); an .aggregate([{ … $where … }]) pipeline; new RegExp(req|request.…); or a $regex: req|request.… operator. Comments are stripped for JS/TS.

Suppress when: the $where/$regex/RegExp value is a hard-coded server-side constant rather than client input, or the JSON.parse(req…) result is validated/coerced (operator keys stripped, fields cast to scalars) before it reaches the query: the static check cannot see that sanitization and may over-report.

Constraints:

  • Make the smallest change that fixes the root cause.
  • Preserve behavior and interfaces unrelated to this diagnostic.
  • Reuse existing project components, utilities, and conventions.
  • Keep validation and authorization on trusted boundaries. Do not replace them with client-only checks.
  • Adapt identifiers and framework details instead of copying blindly.
  • Do not disable the rule or suppress matching code.
  • Confirm this rule is enabled for the project: production .js/.ts/.jsx/.tsx/.py files; test/build/doc/generated paths skipped.

Assessment:

  • Record detector evidence, applicability facts, assumptions, missing evidence, and the rule class for this occurrence.
  • Return one outcome: Confirmed failure, Rejected, Needs evidence, Unavailable, Waived with evidence, or Observation.
  • A waiver records the established failure, scope, authority, evidence, and review or expiry condition. It is not a pass or false positive.

Verification:

  • Run focused tests for the changed behavior.
  • Run React Doctor and confirm this diagnostic no longer appears from changed code.
  • Run an unfiltered scan of the affected scope before claiming no cross-category regression.
  • Report the files changed and any checks you could not run.