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Rules reference

react-doctor/local-rpc-native-bridge-risk

A localhost or native bridge that accepts loose origins and exposes install/update or shell commands lets a malicious web page drive native actions on the user's machine.

  • Category: Security
  • Severity: warn
  • Source: oxlint-plugin-react-doctor
  • Framework: global
  • Enabled when: production source files (.js/.ts/.jsx/.tsx, etc.); test/build/doc/generated paths skipped
  • Tags: security-scan
  • Default: Enabled

Validation prompt

Use this to decide whether a fired diagnostic is real or a false positive.

Fires when a localhost/bridge token (127.0.0.1, localhost, Access-Control-Allow-Origin, or websocket/WebSocket) is followed within ~700 chars by a native-capability command: UpdateApp, InstallApp, child_process, or a bare exec(File)(Sync)/spawn(Sync)( call (a negative lookbehind excludes method calls like regex.exec(). Comments are stripped first. FALSE POSITIVE: the localhost reference and the command are unrelated code that merely co-occur within the window, or the apparent command is a generic verb (install/update/includes/indexOf used as ordinary state updates or dev-server helpers) — those generic verbs are deliberately NOT matched, only concrete native-capability calls are.

Fix prompt

Use this once validation confirms the diagnostic is real.

Treat the local server as a trust boundary: parse the request Origin with new URL(...) and check it against an exact allowlist (never substring or includes matching, never Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *), require a per-request nonce or CSRF token, and expose only narrow, named methods. Never let a web page trigger exec/spawn or native install/update; gate any privileged command behind out-of-band user confirmation and signed payloads.

More Security rules from the rules reference:

  • react-doctor/mcp-tool-capability-risk: An MCP tool runs with the connecting client's authority, so reaching shell, filesystem, or network primitives without validation lets injected input abuse them.
  • react-doctor/mdx-ssr-execution-risk: Compiling untrusted MDX with the full pipeline runs attacker-supplied JSX and expressions on your server, which can lead to code execution.
  • react-doctor/nextjs-no-side-effect-in-get-handler: Move the side effect to a POST handler and use a <form> or fetch with method POST — GET requests can be triggered by prefetching and are vulnerable to CSRF
  • react-doctor/no-danger: Flag dangerouslySetInnerHTML — raw HTML injection bypasses JSX escaping and invites cross-site scripting.
  • react-doctor/no-eval: Use `JSON.parse` for serialized data, `Function(...)` (still careful) for trusted templates, or refactor to avoid dynamic code execution