react-doctor/local-rpc-native-bridge-risk

A localhost or native bridge that accepts loose origins and exposes install/update or shell commands lets a malicious web page drive native actions on the user's machine.

Validation prompt

Confirm the detector match and collect the required evidence before deciding whether an edit is warranted.

Fires when a localhost/bridge token (127.0.0.1, localhost, Access-Control-Allow-Origin, or websocket/WebSocket) is followed within ~700 chars by a native-capability command: UpdateApp, InstallApp, child_process, or a bare exec(File)(Sync)/spawn(Sync)( call (a negative lookbehind excludes method calls like regex.exec(). Comments are stripped first.

Suppress when: the localhost reference and the command are unrelated code that merely co-occur within the window, or the apparent command is a generic verb (install/update/includes/indexOf used as ordinary state updates or dev-server helpers): those generic verbs are deliberately NOT matched, only concrete native-capability calls are.

Evidence boundary

The diagnostic proves only that the detector’s modeled source pattern matched. It does not prove runtime impact, product intent, rendered failure, or that one remediation is correct.

Establish the environment, repository policy, exceptions, and required rendered or runtime evidence before deciding the occurrence.

Record one outcome:

• Confirmed failure: The required evidence establishes the violation.
• Rejected: A documented exception or false-positive predicate applies.
• Needs evidence: Named evidence can still be collected.
• Unavailable: Required evidence cannot be collected in this run.
• Waived with evidence: An authorized, scoped exception applies to an established failure.
• Observation: The review records an optional tradeoff without claiming a defect.

A waiver records its scope, authority, evidence, and review condition. It is not a pass or false positive.

Default severity is registry metadata. Use the occurrence’s JSON severity after repository configuration when ordering real findings.

Fix prompt

Apply this candidate correction only after the required evidence confirms the risk.

Treat the local server as a trust boundary: parse the request Origin with new URL(...) and check it against an exact allowlist (never substring or includes matching, never Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *), require a per-request nonce or CSRF token, and expose only narrow, named methods. Never let a web page trigger exec/spawn or native install/update; gate any privileged command behind out-of-band user confirmation and signed payloads.

Repository-wide copy prompt

Use this repository-wide prompt only after validating each occurrence. For one occurrence, use the guidance above.