react-doctor/insecure-crypto-risk

Weak primitives (MD5, SHA-1, DES, RC4), non-timing-safe comparisons, or `Math.random()` for security values make signatures, tokens, and passwords easier to forge or guess.

Validation prompt

Confirm the detector match and collect the required evidence before deciding whether an edit is warranted.

Fires on the first of: a weak hash createHash('md5'|'sha1') or md5( with a security word (password/token/secret/signature/auth/credential/session/cookie/csrf/api-key) within ~250 chars; a weak cipher (createCipheriv('des'|'rc4'|'blowfish'|…), deprecated createCipher/createDecipher, or a DES/RC4/Blowfish name in a cipher context); a timing-unsafe signature comparison with ==/=== in a non-.jsx/.tsx file that lacks timingSafeEqual; or Math.random() on a line also naming token/secret/password/nonce/salt/csrf/credential/otp.

Suppress when: the hash/random is non-secret (cache key, _id/etag, a UI focus-nonce), the comparison is against an enum/status/boolean or a signatureMethod/signatureType metadata name (all explicitly excluded), or a protocol mandates md5/sha1 (Gravatar, HTTP Digest, OAuth 1.0): those contexts are exempted by path and surrounding-text checks.

Evidence boundary

The diagnostic proves only that the detector’s modeled source pattern matched. It does not prove runtime impact, product intent, rendered failure, or that one remediation is correct.

Establish the environment, repository policy, exceptions, and required rendered or runtime evidence before deciding the occurrence.

Record one outcome:

• Confirmed failure: The required evidence establishes the violation.
• Rejected: A documented exception or false-positive predicate applies.
• Needs evidence: Named evidence can still be collected.
• Unavailable: Required evidence cannot be collected in this run.
• Waived with evidence: An authorized, scoped exception applies to an established failure.
• Observation: The review records an optional tradeoff without claiming a defect.

A waiver records its scope, authority, evidence, and review condition. It is not a pass or false positive.

Default severity is registry metadata. Use the occurrence’s JSON severity after repository configuration when ordering real findings.

Fix prompt

Apply this candidate correction only after the required evidence confirms the risk.

Replace MD5/SHA-1 with SHA-256 or stronger (and bcrypt/scrypt/argon2 for passwords); replace DES/RC4/Blowfish and createCipher/createDecipher with AES-256-GCM via createCipheriv. Compare signatures and MACs with crypto.timingSafeEqual on the server, and generate tokens, nonces, and salts with crypto.randomBytes/crypto.getRandomValues, never Math.random(). Where MD5/SHA-1 is genuinely non-security (checksums, cache keys), move it off the security path or rename it so the intent is clear.

Repository-wide copy prompt

Use this repository-wide prompt only after validating each occurrence. For one occurrence, use the guidance above.