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react-doctor/firebase-query-filter-as-auth

Relying on a client-side Firestore `.where('userId', '==', …)` filter for access control is unsafe, because a client can drop the filter and read everyone's data.

Status
Active
Category
Security
Assessment
Evidence-required risk
Required evidence
source code, repository context
Default configuration
Enabled
Default severity
warn
Show technical metadata
Scope
All supported frameworks
Active when
client (non-server) production source files (.js/.ts/.jsx/.tsx); server/api/route dirs and test/build/doc/generated paths skipped
Tags
security-scan
Priority
66 (P2)
Source
oxlint-plugin-react-doctor
Rule set
oxlint-plugin-react-doctor 0.9.3 (prompt schema 2)
On this page

Validation prompt

Confirm the detector match and collect the required evidence before deciding whether an edit is warranted.

Fires when client code calls .where('<field>', '==', …) where <field> is an auth-shaped key: uid, userId/userID, ownerId/ownerID, orgId/orgID, tenantId/tenantID, or role: i.e. a Firestore query that scopes results by identity/tenant/role. The concern: a client query filter is not an access-control boundary, since a client can issue the same query without it.

Suppress when: the matching .where(...) is only UX/data-scoping AND the project's Firestore security rules already enforce the same request.auth.uid/membership check server-side: then the filter is defense-in-depth, not the sole gate. Only the literal == operator on a literal field-name string is matched.

Evidence boundary

The diagnostic proves only that the detector’s modeled source pattern matched. It does not prove runtime impact, product intent, rendered failure, or that one remediation is correct.

Establish the environment, repository policy, exceptions, and required rendered or runtime evidence before deciding the occurrence.

Record one outcome:

  • Confirmed failure: The required evidence establishes the violation.
  • Rejected: A documented exception or false-positive predicate applies.
  • Needs evidence: Named evidence can still be collected.
  • Unavailable: Required evidence cannot be collected in this run.
  • Waived with evidence: An authorized, scoped exception applies to an established failure.
  • Observation: The review records an optional tradeoff without claiming a defect.

A waiver records its scope, authority, evidence, and review condition. It is not a pass or false positive.

Default severity is registry metadata. Use the occurrence’s JSON severity after repository configuration when ordering real findings.

Fix prompt

Apply this candidate correction only after the required evidence confirms the risk.

Treat the client .where(...) as convenience only and enforce access in firestore.rules: inside the match block require request.auth != null and compare the document against request.auth.uid (or a trusted memberships/roles collection via get()), so reads and writes are denied regardless of the query. Keep the filter for scoping, never for security.

Repository-wide copy prompt

Use this repository-wide prompt only after validating each occurrence. For one occurrence, use the guidance above.

Show repository-wide prompt

Fix every confirmed react-doctor/firebase-query-filter-as-auth diagnostic in the current repository.

Required change:

  • Treat the client .where(...) as convenience only and enforce access in firestore.rules: inside the match block require request.auth != null and compare the document against request.auth.uid (or a trusted memberships/roles collection via get()), so reads and writes are denied regardless of the query. Keep the filter for scoping, never for security.

Validation before editing:

Fires when client code calls .where('<field>', '==', …) where <field> is an auth-shaped key: uid, userId/userID, ownerId/ownerID, orgId/orgID, tenantId/tenantID, or role: i.e. a Firestore query that scopes results by identity/tenant/role. The concern: a client query filter is not an access-control boundary, since a client can issue the same query without it.

Suppress when: the matching .where(...) is only UX/data-scoping AND the project's Firestore security rules already enforce the same request.auth.uid/membership check server-side: then the filter is defense-in-depth, not the sole gate. Only the literal == operator on a literal field-name string is matched.

Constraints:

  • Make the smallest change that fixes the root cause.
  • Preserve behavior and interfaces unrelated to this diagnostic.
  • Reuse existing project components, utilities, and conventions.
  • Keep validation and authorization on trusted boundaries. Do not replace them with client-only checks.
  • Adapt identifiers and framework details instead of copying blindly.
  • Do not disable the rule or suppress matching code.
  • Confirm this rule is enabled for the project: client (non-server) production source files (.js/.ts/.jsx/.tsx); server/api/route dirs and test/build/doc/generated paths skipped.

Assessment:

  • Record detector evidence, applicability facts, assumptions, missing evidence, and the rule class for this occurrence.
  • Return one outcome: Confirmed failure, Rejected, Needs evidence, Unavailable, Waived with evidence, or Observation.
  • A waiver records the established failure, scope, authority, evidence, and review or expiry condition. It is not a pass or false positive.

Verification:

  • Run focused tests for the changed behavior.
  • Run React Doctor and confirm this diagnostic no longer appears from changed code.
  • Run an unfiltered scan of the affected scope before claiming no cross-category regression.
  • Report the files changed and any checks you could not run.