react-doctor/firebase-client-owned-authz-field
When the client writes ownership or role fields (`ownerId`, `orgId`, `role`, `isAdmin`) to Firebase/Supabase, an attacker can forge them and grant themselves access.
- Status
- Active
- Category
- Security
- Assessment
- Evidence-required risk
- Required evidence
- source code, repository context
- Default configuration
- Enabled
- Default severity
- error
Show technical metadata
- Scope
- All supported frameworks
- Active when
- client-side production source only (server dirs api/server/functions/middleware/routes and *.server.* files skipped) where the file shows Firebase/Supabase evidence in its path or content
- Tags
- security-scan
- Priority
- 76 (P1)
- Source
- oxlint-plugin-react-doctor
- Rule set
- oxlint-plugin-react-doctor 0.9.3 (prompt schema 2)
Validation prompt
Confirm the detector match and collect the required evidence before deciding whether an edit is warranted.
Fires only in CLIENT-side production source (server dirs like api//server//functions//middleware/ and *.server.* files are excluded) where the file shows Firebase/Supabase evidence: the words firebase/firestore/supabase, or a setDoc(/addDoc( call, in the path or content. Within that file it matches a client write: setDoc(/updateDoc(/addDoc(, or a collection(...).set|update|add(: occurring within ~700 chars of an authority-field name: ownerId/creatorId/providerId/orgId/tenantId/workspaceId/ghostOrg/role/roles/isAdmin.
Suppress when: already guarded: an in-house data writer that merely shares a method name like updateDoc(...) without any Firebase/Supabase evidence is skipped; a remaining FP is a write where the authority field is server-derived/immutable and re-validated by Firestore rules or RLS (e.g. the client echoes its own already-authenticated uid that the rules pin to request.auth.uid), rather than a value an attacker could forge.
Evidence boundary
The diagnostic proves only that the detector’s modeled source pattern matched. It does not prove runtime impact, product intent, rendered failure, or that one remediation is correct.
Establish the environment, repository policy, exceptions, and required rendered or runtime evidence before deciding the occurrence.
Record one outcome:
- Confirmed failure: The required evidence establishes the violation.
- Rejected: A documented exception or false-positive predicate applies.
- Needs evidence: Named evidence can still be collected.
- Unavailable: Required evidence cannot be collected in this run.
- Waived with evidence: An authorized, scoped exception applies to an established failure.
- Observation: The review records an optional tradeoff without claiming a defect.
A waiver records its scope, authority, evidence, and review condition. It is not a pass or false positive.
Default severity is registry metadata. Use the occurrence’s JSON severity after repository configuration when ordering real findings.
Fix prompt
Apply this candidate correction only after the required evidence confirms the risk.
Do not let the client set authority fields. Write ownerId, tenantId, role, and isAdmin on the server (a callable/cloud function or your backend) from the authenticated identity, and enforce them in Firestore/Storage rules (or Supabase RLS) so a forged client write is rejected. For example, require request.auth.uid == request.resource.data.ownerId on create and make the field immutable on update. Never write isAdmin/role from client code.
Repository-wide copy prompt
Use this repository-wide prompt only after validating each occurrence. For one occurrence, use the guidance above.
Show repository-wide prompt
Fix every confirmed react-doctor/firebase-client-owned-authz-field diagnostic in the current repository.
Required change:
- Do not let the client set authority fields. Write
ownerId,tenantId,role, andisAdminon the server (a callable/cloud function or your backend) from the authenticated identity, and enforce them in Firestore/Storage rules (or Supabase RLS) so a forged client write is rejected. For example, requirerequest.auth.uid == request.resource.data.ownerIdon create and make the field immutable on update. Never writeisAdmin/rolefrom client code.
Validation before editing:
Fires only in CLIENT-side production source (server dirs like api//server//functions//middleware/ and *.server.* files are excluded) where the file shows Firebase/Supabase evidence: the words firebase/firestore/supabase, or a setDoc(/addDoc( call, in the path or content. Within that file it matches a client write: setDoc(/updateDoc(/addDoc(, or a collection(...).set|update|add(: occurring within ~700 chars of an authority-field name: ownerId/creatorId/providerId/orgId/tenantId/workspaceId/ghostOrg/role/roles/isAdmin.
Suppress when: already guarded: an in-house data writer that merely shares a method name like updateDoc(...) without any Firebase/Supabase evidence is skipped; a remaining FP is a write where the authority field is server-derived/immutable and re-validated by Firestore rules or RLS (e.g. the client echoes its own already-authenticated uid that the rules pin to request.auth.uid), rather than a value an attacker could forge.
Constraints:
- Make the smallest change that fixes the root cause.
- Preserve behavior and interfaces unrelated to this diagnostic.
- Reuse existing project components, utilities, and conventions.
- Keep validation and authorization on trusted boundaries. Do not replace them with client-only checks.
- Adapt identifiers and framework details instead of copying blindly.
- Do not disable the rule or suppress matching code.
- Confirm this rule is enabled for the project:
client-side production source only (server dirs api/server/functions/middleware/routes and *.server.* files skipped) where the file shows Firebase/Supabase evidence in its path or content.
Assessment:
- Record detector evidence, applicability facts, assumptions, missing evidence, and the rule class for this occurrence.
- Return one outcome: Confirmed failure, Rejected, Needs evidence, Unavailable, Waived with evidence, or Observation.
- A waiver records the established failure, scope, authority, evidence, and review or expiry condition. It is not a pass or false positive.
Verification:
- Run focused tests for the changed behavior.
- Run React Doctor and confirm this diagnostic no longer appears from changed code.
- Run an unfiltered scan of the affected scope before claiming no cross-category regression.
- Report the files changed and any checks you could not run.